


ER-File



19 FEB 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. E. H. Knoche

FROM : Admiral Turner


SUBJECT : Presentation to the Cabinet

1. The President has reaffirmed to me briefly the report we read in the press that he wants me at an early date to make a presentation to the Cabinet on the capabilities of the Intelligence Community and what support we may provide to the Cabinet. I would like to be prepared to do that as soon as possible.

2. I have in mind a maximum of ten minutes. I believe we must do this without viewgraphs or such visual aids, although a one or two page handout might be very helpful. I think we could distribute that around the table.

3. I would like particularly to point out the kinds of support we might provide to officers other than State, Defense, and Treasury, who are our regular customers. In this connection, I would like to propose a formalized liaison system between us and each Cabinet officer. I would envision this system being such that there would be just enough interchange that we would always be sure we knew the primary activities and concerns of these Cabinet officers. We could search our data bank to see if we have materials useful to this particular concern. I told the President that I intended to volunteer support to the Cabinet in this way rather than just expect them to call on us. I'm not clear in my mind as to whether the best point of contact for Cabinet officers' staffs should be in the IC Staff or the Agency staff.

4. Please work together in putting a presentation together.



STANSFIELD TURNER

*Succession*  
*DCI look*

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002500110013-2

NOTE FOR: Mr. Knoche

25X1

(This paper is responsive to Item #13 of my memorandum of 9 February to Morning Meeting participants.)

25X1

25X1

Attachment:  
As stated

This is good but needs a bit more work. The collection section is too specific and not talk about how we maintain a second tier, p. 4 re general. Let's not talk about how we maintain a second tier, p. 4 re coverage but do have some major gaps. The second tier, p. 4 re "interchangeability" is extremely important and needs elaboration. Last by, the new DCI can have a headout -- unclassified members can pass out that Cabinet 25X1 covering what we can do and how they can ask. An

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002500110013-2

15 February 1977

PROPOSED REMARKS BY ADMIRAL TURNER AT THE FIRST CABINET SESSION HE ATTENDS:

As one who comes so new to the profession of intelligence, I welcome the invitation of the President to share a few of my thoughts with the members of his Cabinet.

The intelligence business differs markedly from the work of the other major departments and agencies of our Government.

- Our customers are primarily top-level officials within the Federal Government itself.
- Your customers are primarily outside the Federal Government--individual American citizens or local governments, or industries, or international organizations or foreign governments.

In today's world almost every area of human activity has the potential for impacting on our national security. So, in a very true sense, I am meeting today with my major customers, the primary users of the intelligence we devote so much attention to collecting and analyzing.

I am told that we only spend about seven cents of each intelligence dollar on analysis and production--and that the bulk of our resources are expended on highly sophisticated technical collection and processing systems.

But it is the end product--the estimates, the current reporting, the analytic memoranda--on which the Intelligence Community is judged.

The President and members of the National Security Council are going to assess my performance as DCI in large measure on how well I see to it that you are provided with the intelligence you need.

- On how adequately you are warned concerning upcoming crises;
- On how responsive our estimates are to your planning needs;

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002500110013-2

**CONFIDENTIAL**

- On how comprehensively our foreign technical data meets your needs in the planning and development of U.S. weapons systems;
- On how well our information prepares you concerning foreign positions in international negotiations.

My reason for mentioning this is to solicit your support.

I have been reminded again in the course of my briefings and reading to prepare for my new job that the communications link is critical to the policy-intelligence relationship. There is a failure in communication:

- If the policymaker fails to make his needs known, even to his own staff, and the intelligence officer has to guess. He may miss.
- If U.S. objectives or actions are so closely held that intelligence officers, unaware of what their own Government is seeking to accomplish, misinterpret evidence of a foreign reaction.

I solicit your thoughtful assistance.

- As I settle into the job, I will be evaluating how well my National Intelligence Officers and other senior intelligence officials are doing in maintaining liaison with the users of intelligence products and identifying customer needs.
- It would be helpful if you would review your own procedures for acquainting your intelligence officers or other officials with your needs for intelligence support.
  - What problems are you most concerned about now?
  - What do you expect will be key problem areas for attention in three months? In six months?

I put this emphasis on our ability to provide timely, high quality, very responsive intelligence because, while problems and challenges remain, I am convinced that I am inheriting the senior post in an Intelligence Community composed of talented and dedicated people whose capabilities have served this country well.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- I make this assessment despite the resource limitations and the reduced manpower that the Community has had to adjust to over the past several years.
- And despite some adverse developments arising from the recent investigations and the consequent publicity given to intelligence activities.
- The impact of the recent investigations is still being felt, but progress is being made:
  - to restore our damaged overseas liaison relationships;
  - to redevelop sources who withdrew their support for fear of publicity;
  - to rebuild the morale of U.S. intelligence personnel, and
  - to strengthen Congressional and public confidence in the way intelligence activities are conducted.

The time has come to deal with the present and plan for the future--not look back on the past.

In the collection field:

- An outstanding advance in technical collection has resulted from the recent introduction of a new system that we consider will have major long-term importance.
- All three of our major collection sources--signals intelligence, imagery, and human resources--are making major contributions to our information base.
- Nevertheless, there are serious gaps. Our information on some of the countries that potentially pose threats to U.S. interests is not as good as I would like. The coordination of the community's efforts to collect a wide range of economic information needs to be improved. We must find ways to sustain the aggressive and creative qualities which have been fundamental to so many of the intelligence successes of the past, while strengthening the institutional controls that must characterize the conduct of the intelligence business in a democratic society.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In the production field, I intend to devote particular attention to:

- Establishing and monitoring priorities by geographic region, by topic and by type of product to assure we are covering the most important needs within available resources,
- Facilitating interdisciplinary approaches to analytic problems,
- Testing new and experimental techniques of analysis, and
- Making better use of computerized data bases in support of our analysts.

One example of the challenges confronting the Intelligence Community reinforces the need for improvement in all of these areas. The recent controversy over the long range strategic designs of the Soviet Union demonstrates once again that --although we have a vast data base from which to draw conclusions about Soviet capabilities-- we are unlikely ever to know all we would like about the intentions of the Soviet decision makers. I will give the highest priority to those actions which strengthen our analytical capability so that we might better understand and even anticipate Soviet intentions.

I already am aware of the serious resources problems the Intelligence Community has. Manpower is down 46 percent since the peak of 1969. Purchasing power is down nearly a third from what it was in 1964. The seed money for new initiatives, such as have been the lifeblood of collection improvements over the past two decades, is now almost nonexistent.

These are the kind of resource problems that confront all of us. I have mentioned a few of the things to which I will give special attention in an effort to improve our performance despite these constraints. As I mentioned earlier, I will need your help and assistance, and look forward to learning more about your specific requirements for intelligence support.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

18 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

25X1

With reference to our suggestions for topics that Admiral Turner might take up in a presentation to the Cabinet, I would urge him to include a call for a change in the way in which the relationship between the CIA and the rest of the Federal Government is perceived in public, here and abroad, on the basis of statements and actions by members of the Cabinet and their representatives. All too often, as we very well know, in spoken and written word the Federal Departments convey to the public the impression not simply of secrecy of CIA operations but also of some sinister isolation and alienation of CIA from the rest of the Federal Government.

I am not suggesting a call for a great upsurge of character testimonials at home and propaganda abroad in our favor. I am convinced, however, that the incoming DCI will have an opportunity to influence the currently distorted and erroneous perception of the CIA that flows directly from the way in which the rest of the Government has grown accustomed to refer to us in public.

25X1

Andrew T. Falkiewicz  
Assistant to the Director

cc:

25X1